We estimate the causal effect of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka on household income and consumption eight years after the event, using a quasi-experimental method. A strong association between area-wide tsunami disaster shock and increases in household income and consumption in the long-term emerged from our empirical investigation. Deviating from the common observation on short-term impacts, these results are suggestive of an optimistic potential for some long-lasting potentially successful recovery scenarios. Still, Sri Lanka received a very large amount of external transfers post-tsunami, much larger than is typical for disaster events and one which may not be replicable in other cases. Our findings suggest a more nuanced picture with respect to household consumption impacts. We observe a reduction of food consumption and only find an increase in non-food consumption. The increase in non-food consumption is much smaller than the observed increase in income. We also find that households in high-income regions experienced much better recovery from the disaster. JEL Q54, R11
Introduction
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake elevated the ocean floor by at least three meters generating a very powerful tsunami that killed 226,000 and displaced more than 2 million people in about a dozen countries. A large number of casualties and property damage associated with high-intensity disasters like tsunamis obviously have short term impacts by reducing economic activity, but relatively less is known about the long-term economic losses. 1 Here, we are interested in households' vulnerability to the long-term impacts of the disaster; specifically, we aim to identify the impact of the tsunami on Sri Lankan households.
In this case, the event was completely unexpected and thus undoubtedly exogenous, but its impact is not. Households' socio-economic characteristics, their exposure and vulnerability to the hazard itself, their resilience and access to tools and mechanisms to manage the disaster's aftermath, their preferences, their decisions when the circumstances around them change, and their choices during the post-event reconstruction all eventually determined the disaster's long-term consequences (Hallegatte et al, 2014; Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010; McCarthy and Smith, 2009; Mechler, Bayer, & Peppiatt, 2006; World Bank, 2013) .
Sri Lanka, an island country in the Indian Ocean, is densely populated, with a 2015 population of 20.7 million (Central Bank, 2015) . The population is 74.9% Sinhalese, 11.2% Sri Lankan Tamil, 4.1% Indian Tamil, and 9.3% Sri Lankan Moor. 20.5%, 26.3% and 45% of population work in the agriculture, industry and service sectors, respectively (Department of Census and Statistics, 2012) . Administratively, Sri Lanka is divided into 9 Provinces, and these are divided further into 25 Districts. Each District is divided into Divisional Secretariats (DS). Each DS consists of several Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions, the lowest administrative unit. Currently, there are 324 DS Divisions and 14,009 GN Divisions in the country (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015) . In the World Bank's classification, Sri Lanka is a lower-middle income country, though social indicators suggest a higher standard of living when compared to other countries in South Asia. From the early 1980s, the country was impacted by an armed uprising; seven districts out of 25 were intensely affected by the 1 Economic losses -sometime referred to as induced or indirect losses -are considered in terms of changes to flows of goods, services and business or even government revenues. These can emerge in various spatial scales, in different economic sectors, and can change rapidly or evolve slowly over longer periods of time (Rose, 2009; Hallegate & Przyluski, 2010; Cochrane, 2004) .
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In the short term, households manage the financial risk they are exposed to because of natural hazards through several risk transfer and risk management tools. Explicit insurance contracts and credit are the primary market-based arrangements available to manage financial risks, but implicit insurance arrangements (from kin, from governments, or from the international community) also play a role in transferring risk away from affected households. 2 Similarly for firms, the availability of resources for post-disaster appears to play a central role in post-disaster recovery.
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The literature, however, suggests that low-income households are credit constrained and their ability to self-insure is limited. This results in variation in expenditures associated with realized risks (Mogues, 2011; Baez and Mason, 2008; Carter et al., 2007; Baez, 2006; Jansen and Carter, 2013) . Because of inadequate risk transfer, poor households use costly ways to confront risk, ways that may have long-lasting adverse consequences. These consequences can be especially severe for the poorest households (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011; Dercon et al., 2007) .
Households accumulate saving to cushion the welfare loss. Evidence suggests that household saving is higher in countries with greater risk exposure and frequency of intense disasters (Aizenman and Noy, 2015; Skidmore, 2001) . When productive assets are lost due to disaster, households may need to reduce consumption to protect their remaining assets (Barrett et al., 2007; Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Little et al., 2006) . Either way, they can fall into "poverty traps" from which recovery is difficult without external asssistance. Carter and Barrett (2006) , for example, provide evidence for such 'asset poverty traps' among pastoralists in northern Kenya.
Reductions in household consumption can have significant adverse consequences to wellbeing, including even reduced height and body mass index for children experiencing these events (Alderman, Haddinot and Kinsey, 2006; Haddinot, 2006 Sawada and Shimizutani (2007) , for example, observe that the households with collateral and free from binding borrowing constraints were better able to cope with income loss following the 1995 Kobe earthquake. With limited access to explicit risk transfer financial instruments, the poor respond to shocks by pooling risk through social mechanisms such as credit cooperatives and mutual assistance pools (Baez, 2006; Little et al, 2006; World Bank, 2013) . 3 Following the tsunami, Sri Lankan firms with access to loans or grants performed better (De Mel et al., 2011) .
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from Chile and Cruso and Miller (2015) from Peru that those exposed to massive earthquakes (in 1960 and 1970, respectively) still show a relative deficit in educational and labour outcomes many decades later. More worrying, the latter project also shows that children whose mothers were affected at birth also manage to complete fewer years of schooling.
When formal insurance or other safety nets are not available, the poor diversify their income sources to lower risk exposure. Typically, this may be done either through labour sector diversification locally or through emigration. Lynham, Noy and Page (2012) 4 And indeed, research shows that remittances play an important role in the households reactions to disasters (Deshingkar and Aheeyarse 2006; Harvey and Group, 2007; Mohapatra et al., 2009; Savage et al., 2007) . Suleri and Savage, 2006) observe that households receiving remittances are able to recover earlier from the 2005 Afghanistan earthquake. Gröger and Zylberberg (2015) observe rural household members in Vietnam migrating to urban areas in the aftermath of the 2009 catastrophic typhoon, and households with settled migrants receiving more remittances in the typhoon's aftermath. Le de, Guillard and Friesen (2014) observe an unequal access to remittances, with the poor having less access and therefore struggling more to recover from the 2012 cyclone in Samoa.
The Aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka
In Initially, the government declared a development-free buffer zone along the coast restricting reconstruction, but later in 2005 this policy was abandoned due to strong opposition from the public (Ingram et al., 2006) . New houses were provided based on proven ownership claims for destroyed houses or, alternatively for those unable to claim land ownership, through a donor-driven program. For completely damaged houses, the government provided land and cash grants and additional donor assistance to rebuild houses. For partially damaged houses, cash grants were provided. Financing for tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka relied mainly on foreign grants. A total of 3.9 billion USD was committed; of which 2.0 billion came from foreign grants and 0.9 billion each from foreign loans (mostly multilateral) and the government of Sri Lanka. Almost 1.4 billion were spent on reconstruction already by the end of 2006 -two years after the tsunami (Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010) . Later, the tsunami reconstruction was managed within the mainstream development program. Despite very large flows of relief and reconstruction funds, reconstruction in Sri Lanka faced problems of coordination, escalation of construction costs, and other similarly common difficulties in post-disaster recoveries (Athukorala, 2012; Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010; Munasinghe et al., 2007) . To isolate the causal effect of the disaster precisely, randomised experimentation is ideal, and a (time-series) panel of households would be preferable. Since randomised experimentation is impossible and panel data are unavailable, we instead use crosssectional data pre-and post-disaster in a quasi-experimental analysis. The identification strategy relies on the standard common trend assumption in difference-in-difference estimations, and we show that this assumption appears appropriate in this case.
Empirical Analysis of Household Survey
To identify the treatment group, we exploit the spatial variation of tsunami damage using reported deaths, displacements, homelessness and infrastructure damage (replacement cost) due to tsunami across districts. Our aim is to reveal the average causal effect from the area-wide tsunami shock. Out of 25 Districts, 13 Districts were affected by the tsunami (Appendix Table 2 ) and reported mortality rates, the number of people displaced, the 8 number of people that became homeless, and the damage to public infrastructure. Out of the 13 affected districts, the HH survey covered only seven districts both before and after the tsunami, as the other six districts were directly involved in the conflict. Our treatment group comprises the households in the affected seven districts for which we have data.
In the absence of household level reported tsunami damage, we first estimate the average effect for all households in the affected districts. However, the exposure of the districts and the households in those districts to the tsunami varied considerably. The regions on the eastern and southern coasts were directly exposed to the tsunami waves coming from eastsouth-east and higher damages were reported in those districts facing in that direction. We also exploit the damage information available across districts to examine how recovery vary when accounting for the level of damage. The district level reported deaths, displacements, homelessness, and the value of public infrastructure damaged are used as the proxies for exposure to the tsunami to identify the relative intensity of the shock across districts. We define a shock index by dividing the impact figures by the total number of households in the respective districts. We thus estimate a second model using a different treatment group:
households in the three most highly affected regions (for which we have data): Galle, Matara, and Hambantota.
The previous literature argued that the long-term impacts vary with the vulnerability of the affected households (duPont and Noy, 2016). To examine the impact of vulnerability on recovery, we estimate two other models. One (Model 3) is estimated for a different treatment group excluding the two richest districts (Colombo and Gampaha) and the other (Model 4) for a treatment group including only the two richest districts excluded in Model 3.
To further examine the sensitivity of our results, we investigate whether the causal effect depends on the type of damage. We estimate models using three disaster index variables: displacement, homelessness, and deaths.
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Our identification uses difference-in-difference (DID) method. The standard empirical specification is:
Modifying the standard model, our empirical specification takes the following.
!"# is the outcomes of interest-household monthly consumption and household monthly income-and; the unit observed is household i, in district d and time t. ! is the treatment dummy defining membership in treatment cross section (affected=1, not affected=0) and !"# are the unobserved affects. ! is a dummy variable to distinguish sample by pre and post treatment (post-tsunami =1, pre-tsunami=0). ! is the treatment effect of interest.
Other than the common trend assumption, treatment exogeneity is a key for unbiased estimation. Treatment effects are naturally heterogeneous across households depending on household characteristics and the community level characteristics that they live in. By adequately controlling for such heterogeneity, the unobserved variation ideally should account for the average causal effect. Household demographic and socio-economic covariates !"# are incorporated into the model to control for household heterogeneity.
Gender (male=1, female=0), age (years), years of education, head of household employment status (binary variables for employed, unemployed and employed in paid occupation), household's ethnic group (binary indicators), and house ownership (binary) are all used in the model estimation. Pre shock differences of the treatment and control group that could be due to different time trends are controlled by year fixed effects ( ! ). The geographic differences are controlled by district fixed effects ( ! ) ; these therefore control for the ! and ! in eq. 1, respectively. Finally, the other differential effects and the mean of the error term !"# are assumed zero. We estimate model 1-4 using this specification.
In a different set of regressions, instead of dummy variable for treatment as in the previous model (eq. 2), we introduce treatment indices ( ! !"# ) into the model. Separate treatment index variables are used for death, displacement and homelessness.
The models are estimated using OLS. Since heteroscedasticity and serial correlation may be present in the data, we use robust and district clustered standard errors for inferences.
10
Results
We rely on several waves of the national household survey conducted by the Sri Lankan government. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of this data. In total, 64% of the observations are of households in the years following the tsunami, while 51% of the households live in the districts affected by the tsunami -33% are of households in the tsunami areas observed in the aftermath. In some of the estimations, we include covariates that are also correlated with income or consumption. The details about these, and the regression results for the two dependent variables, income, and consumption are provided in Appendix Tables 6 and 7 , respectively.
Income
Table 2 presents our benchmark results for household income. We observe the average treatment (tsunami) effect (ATE) on household income by examining the coefficient ( ! in equation 2) for the interaction of the treatment indicator (tsunami-affected district), and post-tsunami year. Columns I-V present several estimations based on different assumptions regarding the standard errors and the inclusion of district fixed effects and district year trends. Column II controls for household heterogeneity; and district fixed-effects are included in column III. The inclusion of district fixed-effects reduces the size of the estimated ATE coefficients, suggesting that some of the observed ATE in column II is an over estimation associated with the higher income in the coastal districts. Column IV includes district-year interactions, but these over-fit the model, and remove much of the impact we associate with the tsunami itself (as our identification of treatment relies on households residing in a tsunami-affected district). Column V is our preferred specification as it includes district clustered standard errors, though results there are not dramatically different from the other specifications. To further examine the validity of our findings, we estimated the log-normal model using the log transformation of the dependent variables (income and consumption covariates and district fixed effects and collapsed by mean and survey years for both control and treatment groups) in figure 1.
In figure 1 , the two parallel lines for treatment and control group before tsunami clearly indicates the absence of different income trend between treatment and control group pretsunami and appears to confirm that our common-trend assumption is valid. The divergence of the two lines in the figure post-tsunami starkly demonstrates our finding: households residing in tsunami affected districts experienced an increase in income in post-tsunami years.
The same model as in column V of table 1, when estimated for the treatment group of the most-affected regions (column VI), reveals a much more moderate income increase shortly after the tsunami -Rs. 2045 in 2006. This effect, compared to an increase of more than three times as much for all affected regions, suggests that the districts that benefited the most were those that were perceived as tsunami affected (and therefore received assistance) but were less heavily damaged. In the longer-term, in the 2009 and 2012 observations, the estimated impact of the tsunami on household income for heavily affected regions becomes negative (but statistically insignificant); compared to large and significant positive impact on all affected districts. Again, this suggests the role that assistance played in recovery, with less affected districts benefiting the most.
Column VII estimated the same model but excluded the two richest regions (one of them is the capital, Colombo). Maybe not surprisingly, in that case as well, we see a much more moderate increase in the positive impact of the tsunami recovery on household income.
Again, this difference is most likely associated with the increased access to post-tsunami assistance for the two richest (and urban) regions that were now excluded. Confirmation of that is found in column VIII, where the model estimated focuses on the ATE for the richest two regions. The identified ATE is 3-5 times as large for the richest as for the poorest affected regions (column VII).
In table 3, we describe the ATE on the various sources of household income. In particular,
we separately examine the ATE for paid income, agricultural income, remittances, transfers, dividends, and rents (and other income). We estimate these using the same specification as in table 2 column V -our preferred specification. In all the different income sources, the but it is statistically significant and positive for 2012. We also observe that not only do we identify the biggest ATE for non-agricultural income, the model's goodness-of-fit is best for that income source. Our ability to determine the cross-household differences in other income sources is much more limited, and the observed tsunami impact (ATE) is in any case much smaller for these. However, the impacts described in table 3 are the ATE averaged over all affected regions, and the districts were exposed to the tsunami in varying degrees.
Results by district (Appendix 8) show that household in all affected regions except Puttlam experienced increase of income and the positive impacts persisted into the 2012 survey. Figure 2 illustrates the variation of impact among the affected districts. 8 We note that the 8 Conversion of Sri Lankan Rupees to USD is based on the August 2016 exchange rate of 1USD=145 Rs.
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2006 survey was conducted less than two years after the tsunami disaster and 2009 marked the most intense fighting between the government and the LTTE, just before the conflict ended in 2010. These observations suggest that our finding that income increased more in 2012 may be quite intuitive. When examining districts separately, we find that Colombo (CMB) and Gampaha(GMP) have significantly higher incomes; while most other districts either have lower income post-tsunami or no observed change.
Consumption
Tables 4 and 5 include the detailed estimation of the impact of the tsunami on household consumption and its components, respectively. As discussed above with respect to income, our preferred specification in column V of table 4 includes the household covariates and the district fixed-effects, and is estimated with district clustered standard errors. In column V, the estimated ATE for consumption is positive in the three years post tsunami for which we have a measurement, but is statistically significant only for the immediate aftermath, and for the longer term (in 2012). As was the case for income, the impact in the longer term (2012) is larger than the impact in the immediate aftermath. Importantly, however, the positive observed increase in consumption is much smaller than the increase we identified in household income. It appears that the increase in income does not translate very well into increases in welfare (consumption).
As we observed that the increase in income was much smaller for the most heavily damaged districts (column VI in table 2), we observe that the same districts did not experience an increase in income but rather appeared to have experienced a decrease in consumption (though the decrease is not statistically significant -see column VI in table 4). The difference between the two richest regions and the rest of the affected regions is less stark for consumption than it was for income, but we still observe a bigger increase in consumption in the richest districts than we observe for the other affected districts in the longer term (columns VII and VIII in table 4).
The normalised income is presented in figure 3 (predicted residuals when regressing consumption against household covariates and district fixed effects are collapsed by mean and survey years for both control and treatment groups). The figure depicts the parallel 14 consumption trends before the 2004 tsunami, and the steeper increase in consumption observed for the treated (impacted) districts. At the district level (results in the appendix 9), we find temporary gains for Matara and Gall; persistent gains for Kalutara, Gampaha, Hambantota, Colombo and Puttlam. Figure 4 illustrates the variation of impact across the impacted districts.
The surveys we use include details questions about expenditure patterns, so we use the same diff-and-diff methodology to identify ATE for each component of expenditure (table 5) .
When distinguishing between food and non-food expenditures, we find that, worryingly, food consumption actually decreased in the affected districts as a consequence of the tsunami, while non-food consumption increased (and that accounts for the overall increase identified in table 4). Especially notable is the decrease in food consumption observed in 2009 (column I table 5), after the inflow of external assistance has ebbed five years after the tsunami. When we examine the separate components of non-food consumption we find, overall, increases in all of the items, with the largest identified increase in, not surprisingly, housing -an increase that is probably related to the cost of reconstruction and the increase in construction costs that is typical of most disaster recoveries. 
Robustness Analyses
In tables 2-5, we found that the tsunami and the ensuing inflow of assistance significantly increase household income, but that consumption gains were much more limited. What explains these lack of 'pass-through' from income to consumption is not immediately obvious. Some expenditure and income components are missing in our data -most relevant seem investment in property. Due to inconsistent survey questions across surveys, all income and expenditure components are not available in our complete time series dataset.
Therefore, the average household consumption is approximately Rs. 3000 higher than the average household income reported in our summary statistics (Table 1) . In order to provide more information on the 'missing income,' we exclude the year 2002 survey (the survey wave with most missing components) and repeated the analysis while including ad-hoc income. These regressions are available from the authors, but they clearly, and similarly, show a positive impact on income and consumption. Still, we again observe income increases to be substantially bigger than the identified consumption increases.
In table 6, we reestimate the key equations using log income (column I and II) and log consumption (column III). Results are similar to the results we previously obtained in the benchmark estimations in column V in table 2 and column V in table 4 for income and consumption, respectively. We see an increase in consumption that is significantly higher than the observed increase in consumption (which in even negative in column III).
Subsequently, in table 7, we aim to account for the relative intensity of tsunami damages in each district. The tsunami's impact is measured separately by deaths, displacements, and 
Conclusion
Few research projects attempt to identify and quantify the long-term impact of a catastrophic disaster on household wellbeing. Most research attention is usually directed to an event in its immediate aftermath, and interest eventually wanes. From a macroeconomic perspective, the majority of the evidence points to no-effect at the national level and more adverse local long-term effect. Yet, little is really known about the impacts at the micro/household level in the longer term. Here, we estimated the causal effect of the Indian
Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka on household income and consumption eight years after the event, using a quasi-experimental method.
A strong association between area-wide tsunami disaster shock and increases in household income and consumption in the long-term emerged from our empirical investigation.
Deviating from the common observation in the literature on short-term impacts, these results are suggestive of an optimistic potential for long-lasting positive consequences.
Nevertheless, our analysis does not provide any evidence to evaluate whether the observed positive effect is due to so-called 'creative destruction' -the replacement of old with new capital and technology. Sri Lanka received a very large amount of external transfers posttsunami, much larger than is typical for disaster events (Becerra et al., 2014 and . The increases in consumption and income can thus be associated not with a 'build-back-better'
reconstruction, but purely due to the infusion of unusually massive amounts of external resources for rebuilding. This infusion is not replicable in other cases, and only an accounting for the amount of assistance received, per district, could possibly start to allow us to differentiate between these two hypotheses.
Our findings suggest a more nuanced picture with respect to household consumption impacts. We observe a reduction of food consumption and only find an increase in non-food consumption. The increase in non-food consumption is much smaller than the increase in income. As previously observed in the literature, it is clearly evident that households in highincome regions experience better recovery from disaster. The positive impact on income is 17 largely 'enjoyed' by the higher income regions. Household consumption follows a similar pattern. As was the case more generally, it is impossible to know, at this point, whether the most dramatic increases in incomes and consumption in the wealthier regions was due to their better resilience (and reduced vulnerability) or a function of their improved ability to capture the inflows of aid into the affected regions. After all, both of these possibilities have been documented in research projects on short-term post-disaster dynamics.
Further improvements to the analysis remain. More rigorous analysis can be obtained by incorporating more variation of the shock using smaller geographical units. This may address possible errors generated by the method used to identify the shock in the present approach.
An evaluation of the plausibility of "creative destruction" hypothesis can also be undertaken by controlling for external financing; which we were unable to do with the available data in this case. Understanding and identifying the distributional impact of the tsunami is also a policy-relevant question we plan to pursue. 
